Trump meets with Zelenskyy in March?

Zelenskyy

Likelihood of President Zelenskyy Leaving Office Before July 2025

(Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News) Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at a press event, with Ukraine’s national colors in the background (file photo).

Background: War-Time Term Extension and Election Postponement

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s regular five-year term was set to end in May 2024, with a presidential election originally due in spring 2024 (Zelensky on legitimacy dispute: My term is not over yet). However, Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 led Ukraine to declare martial law, under which the constitution explicitly bans national elections (presidential, parliamentary, and local) (Zelensky on legitimacy dispute: My term is not over yet). As a result, the 2024 elections were postponed, and Zelenskyy has remained in office beyond his normal term limit. Ukrainian law provides that an incumbent continues to perform presidential duties until a new leader can be elected (Zelenskiy: Ukraine Elections Possible This Year If Martial Law Ends). In a May 2024 interview, Zelenskyy asserted that “my five-year term is not over yet… It is continuing due to martial law” (Zelensky on legitimacy dispute: My term is not over yet), emphasizing that the war’s exigencies necessitate his continued tenure.

Ukraine’s parliament has since formally affirmed this arrangement. On Feb. 25, 2025, the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) passed a resolution declaring that no elections can be held under martial law and that national elections should take place only after “a comprehensive, just, and sustainable peace is secured” (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt) (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt). This resolution underscored the “need for continuity of leadership” during wartime (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt). It effectively extends Zelenskyy’s mandate until the war ends and martial law is lifted, a step which constitutional experts agree is allowed under Ukrainian law in these circumstances (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt). In short, as long as heavy fighting continues and martial law remains in force, regular elections are frozen and Zelenskyy is expected to stay in office.

Zelenskyy has repeatedly vowed that elections will be held as soon as conditions allow, but argues that free and fair voting is impossible amid an ongoing invasion (Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections - Atlantic Council). In January 2025, he suggested that if a peace settlement ended the “hot phase” of the war, martial law could be lifted and elections could occur “this year”, with parliament scheduling a vote promptly rather than “spend years waiting” (Zelenskiy: Ukraine Elections Possible This Year If Martial Law Ends). Importantly, however, he would not say yet whether he intends to run for a second term when elections do happen, noting that focusing on campaign goals during wartime is “not my goal” at present (Zelenskiy: Ukraine Elections Possible This Year If Martial Law Ends). Until peace arrives, the wartime constitutional order and political consensus both favor Zelenskyy remaining at the helm.

Domestic Political Climate and Support for Zelenskyy

Despite the prolonged war and hardships, domestic support for Zelenskyy remains robust, and there is little internal pressure for him to step down early. Recent polls show the Ukrainian public continues to back their wartime president. In fact, as of early 2025, around 63% of Ukrainians approve of Zelenskyy’s performance as president (63% of Ukrainians approve of Zelensky as president, poll shows) – a striking rebuttal to claims by critics that his support has collapsed. (This approval rating is down from the sky-high ~84–90% rally-round-the-flag peaks seen right after the invasion, but it is still very high by normal standards (Fact Check: Zelenskiy's latest approval rating is 63%, not 4%, contrary to Trump's claim  | Reuters) (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News).) Another survey in February 2025 found 57% of Ukrainians trust Zelenskyy, versus 37% who do not (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters). These figures underscore that, nearly three years into the war, Zelenskyy remains by far the most popular politician in Ukraine (63% of Ukrainians approve of Zelensky as president, poll shows).

Critically, if an election were held today, polls indicate Zelenskyy would lead the field by a wide margin. A KIIS survey (published Feb. 19, 2025) found that 26–32% of voters would back Zelenskyy in a first-round vote – well ahead of any rival (63% of Ukrainians approve of Zelensky as president, poll shows). By comparison, his nearest traditional competitor, former president Petro Poroshenko, polled only around 5–6% support (63% of Ukrainians approve of Zelensky as president, poll shows). No other civilian politician comes close to Zelenskyy’s level of public confidence. The only figure frequently mentioned as a potential challenger is General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, the respected former commander-in-chief turned ambassador, but Zaluzhnyi has voiced no political ambitions (63% of Ukrainians approve of Zelensky as president, poll shows). In essence, Zelenskyy would be heavily favored to win re-election if Ukrainians went to the polls – a point worth noting when assessing whether he might be forced out early.

Moreover, there is a broad domestic consensus against holding an election during the war in the first place. Ukrainians take pride in their democracy, but most agree that trying to conduct a nationwide vote under Russian attack is neither practical nor legitimate. A February 2025 opinion poll found 63% of Ukrainians oppose any national elections until the war is over (Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections - Atlantic Council). Even Zelenskyy’s major political opponents share this view. Both Petro Poroshenko and longtime opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko have publicly rejected the idea of wartime elections as unworkable and dangerous (Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections - Atlantic Council). In fact, all the leaders of Ukraine’s political parties – including the ruling party and opposition – reportedly agreed that no elections will be held until at least six months after martial law ends (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News). This domestic unity reflects a recognition that an election during an invasion could fracture Ukraine’s wartime solidarity and be exploited by the enemy. Ukraine’s vibrant civil society has also voiced opposition to rushing into elections before peace is secured (Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections - Atlantic Council). Simply put, inside Ukraine there is very little appetite or push for Zelenskyy to leave office early while the existential fight against Russia rages on.

International Pressures and Calls for Elections

The main calls for President Zelenskyy to step aside before 2025 – or for Ukraine to hold an early election – are actually coming from outside Ukraine. Notably, Russia and the new U.S. Trump administration have both been pressuring Kyiv to go to the polls sooner rather than later, albeit for their own strategic reasons. This has created an unusual situation where two very different actors – the Kremlin and Washington under President Donald Trump – are echoing each other’s demands for Ukrainian elections, even as Ukraine’s other allies strongly disagree (Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections - Atlantic Council).

• Russian Position: Moscow has clear motives for wanting Zelenskyy out. Russian President Vladimir Putin has claimed that Zelenskyy is “illegitimate” because Ukraine postponed its 2024 elections (Why Early Elections in Ukraine Pave the Way for Putin – Foreign Policy). The Kremlin argues that since Zelenskyy’s original term expired, he supposedly has “no right” to sign any peace deal – an obvious ploy to undermine any Ukrainian negotiating position (Why Early Elections in Ukraine Pave the Way for Putin – Foreign Policy). Putin has openly tied any future peace agreement to leadership change in Kyiv. In fact, he “insisted he won’t sign a peace agreement unless Ukraine agrees to hold elections” (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News), effectively setting Zelenskyy’s removal (via a vote) as a precondition for ending the war. This aligns with one of Putin’s key war objectives: achieving what he calls “denazification” – a propaganda term Russia uses to describe toppling Ukraine’s government (Why Early Elections in Ukraine Pave the Way for Putin – Foreign Policy). (Ironically, Zelenskyy is Jewish, but Russian state media still paint him as heading a “Nazi” regime for domestic propaganda purposes (Why Early Elections in Ukraine Pave the Way for Putin – Foreign Policy).) Replacing Zelenskyy through an election would allow Moscow to claim victory on that front. It could also potentially bring a less defiant, more Russia-friendly leader to power in Ukraine – or at least inject chaos into Kyiv’s leadership. In sum, the Kremlin is “eager to see a change in [Ukraine’s] leadership” and views early elections as a means to that end (Why Early Elections in Ukraine Pave the Way for Putin – Foreign Policy).
• Trump Administration Position: Since taking office in January 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump has dramatically shifted U.S. policy on Ukraine, and part of that shift has included pressure for Ukraine to hold elections despite the war. In mid-February, Trump sparked outrage among U.S. allies by denouncing Zelenskyy as a “dictator without elections.” “Zelenskyy better move fast or he is not going to have a country left,” Trump warned, arguing that Ukraine must seek peace quickly (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters) (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters). He highlighted the fact that Ukraine hasn’t held its scheduled elections, using it to cast Zelenskyy as an undemocratic leader. Trump went so far as to claim (incorrectly) that Zelenskyy’s approval in Ukraine was only 4% (Fact Check: Zelenskiy's latest approval rating is 63%, not 4%, contrary to Trump's claim  | Reuters) – a figure Reuters debunked as false, noting the real approval is many times higher (Fact Check: Zelenskiy's latest approval rating is 63%, not 4%, contrary to Trump's claim  | Reuters). Trump’s rhetoric closely mirrors Putin’s: he asserted Ukraine “should never have started” the war (a distortion of history) and suggested new elections in Ukraine should be a precondition for U.S. support or for peace negotiations (Why Early Elections in Ukraine Pave the Way for Putin – Foreign Policy). According to Foreign Policy, on Feb. 18 Trump said Ukraine needs to “have new elections” before any negotiations, effectively questioning Zelenskyy’s legitimacy during wartime (Why Early Elections in Ukraine Pave the Way for Putin – Foreign Policy). In practice, Trump officials are now floating a diplomatic “peace plan” that would involve early elections. U.S. envoy Keith Kellogg, Trump’s point man for Russia/Ukraine, has outlined a potential three-stage approach: first a ceasefire, then Ukrainian elections, and then a peace treaty signing (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News). Both Washington (under Trump) and Moscow seem to agree on forcing the election issue: “the U.S. and Russia are in agreement that Ukrainians must go to the polls” as part of a peace process, Fox News reported (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News). Kellogg indicated the White House would like to see Ukraine hold elections “possibly by the end of the year” 2025 if a peace deal can be reached (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News). This U.S. stance is unprecedented – the previous U.S. administration under Biden prioritized Ukrainian victory and democratic self-determination, whereas President Trump appears to view early elections as a tool to jump-start negotiations, even if it risks Zelenskyy’s position.
• Zelenskyy’s Reaction: Ukrainian officials have pushed back firmly against these external calls for an election. Zelenskyy publicly rebuked Trump’s “dictator” remarks, calling them “Russian disinformation” and warning that “any attempt to replace [me] would fail.” (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters) He argued that Trump is “trapped in a Russian disinformation bubble” about Ukraine (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters) (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters). In response to envoy Kellogg’s suggestions, Zelenskyy pointedly invited Kellogg to come visit Ukraine and talk to ordinary Ukrainians before advocating wartime elections. “Then he would understand the people and all our circumstances,” Zelenskyy said, noting that Ukrainians are alarmed by talk of premature voting (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News). This was essentially a challenge for U.S. officials to see firsthand why holding a vote now – with millions displaced, many men at the front, and Russian missiles still flying – would be extraordinarily difficult and dangerous.
• Allies and International Officials: Other Western leaders and international bodies have largely rallied to Zelenskyy’s defense amid these accusations. The UN was quick to reaffirm Zelenskyy’s legitimacy, with a UN spokesperson stating that Zelenskyy “sits in office after duly-held elections” (a reference to his landslide democratic victory in 2019) (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters). When asked point-blank who started the war, the UN spokesperson dryly responded: “Russia invaded Ukraine”, contradicting any narrative that blames Ukraine (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters). Top European allies were similarly outspoken. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz criticized Trump’s comments, calling it “false and dangerous” to label Zelenskyy a dictator (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters). In Australia – a close U.S. ally that has provided significant aid to Ukraine – officials from both the government and opposition rejected Trump’s assertions. “The war in Ukraine must be resolved on Ukraine’s terms, because the aggressor here is Russia,” Australian Defense Minister Richard Marles said, adding that Ukraine is a democracy fighting for its life (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters). Opposition leader Peter Dutton was even more blunt: “President Trump has got it wrong… Australia should stand strong with the people of Ukraine. Vladimir Putin is a murderous dictator, and we shouldn’t be giving him an inch.” (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters). Even within the U.S., a number of Republican lawmakers have gently pushed back. Several prominent Republicans in Congress said they disagree that Zelenskyy is a dictator or that Ukraine caused the war (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters). However, most stopped short of directly rebuking Trump; for instance, Senate GOP leader John Thune simply urged giving Trump “space” to attempt a peace deal (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters).

In summary, Russia and the Trump-led U.S. are applying pressure for an early Ukrainian election – essentially urging Zelenskyy’s early exit – but Ukraine’s own public and its other international partners (Europe, UN, etc.) broadly oppose this idea. The external pressure has, if anything, prompted Ukraine’s parliament to double-down on its no-elections-during-war stance (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt). Ukraine’s Foreign Minister responded to Trump’s comments by reaffirming “we will defend our right to exist” and will not be coerced into concessions (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters). For now, Zelenskyy enjoys solid international legitimacy as Ukraine’s elected leader, and Western aid continues to flow, though the Trump administration’s stance has introduced new uncertainties.

Constitutional and Political Factors Influencing Zelenskyy’s Tenure

A range of legal, constitutional, and political factors will determine whether Zelenskyy stays in office or leaves before mid-2025. These include Ukraine’s wartime legal framework, the progression of the war itself, and any peace/ceasefire deals that might alter the equation:

• Martial Law and Constitutional Rules: Ukraine’s constitution prohibits national elections during martial law (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters). This is not a vague principle but a black-and-white legal barrier – one that has been continuously upheld since 2022. Martial law has been extended in 90-day increments repeatedly as the war drags on (Zelenskiy: Ukraine Elections Possible This Year If Martial Law Ends). Under this framework, Zelenskyy’s term legally continues until a new election can be organized (Zelenskiy: Ukraine Elections Possible This Year If Martial Law Ends). The recent parliamentary resolution explicitly emphasized that the constitution “does not allow for elections… At the same time, the Ukrainian people are united in the opinion that such elections should be held after the war’s end.” (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt) In other words, both law and public opinion align on this point. The continuity of governance during an invasion is seen as paramount; abruptly changing leaders or holding a contentious campaign now could violate the constitution and undercut the war effort. Unless martial law is lifted, no constitutional mechanism exists for Zelenskyy to be replaced (short of extraordinary measures like impeachment, which there is currently no political will for).
• Parliamentary Support: Zelenskyy’s Servant of the People party holds a majority in the Ukrainian parliament, and even opposition factions have generally closed ranks in wartime. Parliament’s Feb. 25 resolution received an overwhelming 268 votes in favor (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt). This indicates that Ukraine’s legislature supports Zelenskyy’s stance of waiting until “sustainable peace” before elections (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt). Just a day earlier, the Rada had initially failed to pass that resolution (due to some MPs being absent or uncertain), but after Trump’s “dictator” remarks stirred anger, they convened again and passed it on the second attempt (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt). The message from the Rada is clear: Zelenskyy has their mandate to continue leading, and his legitimacy is formally upheld despite the elapsed term. Any early removal would require a major about-face by this parliament, which is unlikely given the current unity and the President’s continuing popularity.
• Prospects for Peace and Elections: The biggest variable is the course of the war in 2024–2025. If a peace agreement or lasting ceasefire were to occur, it could create the conditions for elections and thus for Zelenskyy’s term to end. Both Russia and the U.S. (under Trump) are linking peace negotiations to the election question. Ukraine, however, insists that security must come first – i.e. end the war, then vote. As Zelenskyy said, “once martial law is over, then the ball is in parliament’s court – [they can] pick a date for elections… no need to wait” long (Zelenskiy: Ukraine Elections Possible This Year If Martial Law Ends) (Zelenskiy: Ukraine Elections Possible This Year If Martial Law Ends). His aides have indicated there would be roughly a six-month preparation period after martial law is lifted before an election is actually held (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News). This buffer is meant to ensure refugees can return, voter rolls updated, campaigning can happen, etc., in a post-war environment. For instance, if a hypothetical peace deal was reached sometime in 2025, one could imagine an election perhaps 6+ months later (the parliamentary leader David Arakhamia has said explicitly that “elections will not be held until at least six months after the end of martial law” (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News)). As of now, a truly “comprehensive” peace (Ukraine’s condition for voting) looks distant. Fighting continues, and officials doubt hostilities will cease in 2025 in a way that permits a fair election. Ivan Gomza, a public policy professor at the Kyiv School of Economics, notes that any ceasefire’s terms would heavily influence Zelenskyy’s re-election chances, and he finds “the cessation of hostilities is hardly plausible in 2025” – predicting elections are “very unlikely until at least 2026.” (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News) This expert view reflects how uncertain a 2025 peace is. Without peace, Zelenskyy cannot constitutionally leave office through an election, meaning he stays by default.
• Extraordinary Scenarios: Outside of a negotiated peace leading to voluntary elections, the scenarios in which Zelenskyy would leave early are extreme and improbable. One would be a collapse of political support or impeachment – but again, there is no evidence of that given his approval ratings and wartime coalition. Another might be a physical incapacitation or death (in a warzone, leaders face risks), but there are no indications of health issues and Ukraine provides heavy security for its president. A coup or internal ouster is also highly unlikely in the current context; Ukraine’s military and security services have remained loyal, and there’s no sign of a faction seeking to depose Zelenskyy. In fact, early in the war, Zelenskyy famously refused opportunities to evacuate, staying in Kyiv even under threat – cementing trust between him and Ukraine’s defense establishment. Thus, barring some unforeseen catastrophe, the only realistic mechanism for Zelenskyy to leave office is an election, which in turn hinges on the war ending.

In light of these factors, the constitutional and political setup strongly favor Zelenskyy remaining in office through mid-2025. The war’s continuation essentially freezes the political calendar. Ukraine’s leadership and people accept this as a necessary suspension of politics-as-usual in order to focus on survival. Any decision to resume normal electoral politics before July 2025 would require a dramatic improvement in the security situation – a development that, at least right now, is not on the immediate horizon.

Expert Analysis: Risks and Scenarios for Early Departure

Most analysts agree that prematurely ending Zelenskyy’s tenure (via an early election or otherwise) would carry significant risks, both for Ukraine’s stability and for the wider war effort. Here are key insights from experts and observers:

• Benefit to Russia: A common theme is that Russia would be the prime beneficiary of an early Ukrainian election. “The only person that benefits from elections before there’s a durable peace deal is Putin,” argues Andrew D’Anieri, an Atlantic Council fellow focused on Eurasia (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News). Moscow excels at exploiting political turbulence – through propaganda, cyber attacks, and covert influence – and an election amidst war would be an inviting target. Russian propaganda already pushes the narrative that Ukraine’s leadership is illegitimate; a contentious campaign could deepen divisions. There’s also the danger that a war-weary electorate might vote for a candidate promising an easier end to the war on Moscow’s terms. As Foreign Policy magazine noted, “removing Zelenskyy and initiating elections is exactly what Russia is waiting for” (Why Early Elections in Ukraine Pave the Way for Putin – Foreign Policy), since it could then claim one of its war aims (regime change) was achieved and possibly get a more pliant Ukrainian counterpart. Past Ukrainian politics show that pro-Russian forces can resurge if conditions allow – for example, after the 2004 pro-democracy Orange Revolution, a Russia-leaning candidate (Viktor Yanukovych) was elected just six years later (Why Early Elections in Ukraine Pave the Way for Putin – Foreign Policy). Western experts caution that a similar rollback could happen again if Ukraine’s unity cracks. For these reasons, many view the push for early elections as a dangerous gambit that could undercut Ukraine’s sovereignty. As one Ukraine advocate put it, post-war elections (after victory or a just peace) would be far safer, whereas wartime elections “offer Russia an opportunity to sow chaos.” (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News) This strategic calculus suggests Zelenskyy stepping down before defeating the invasion could have dire consequences.
• Democratic Values vs Wartime Reality: There is an acknowledgement that Ukraine faces a democratic dilemma – it prides itself on regular elections, yet it has had to pause them for survival. Some outside commentators (like President Trump’s envoy) argue that “healthy” democracies have held elections even during wars ('Healthy' democracies can hold elections in wartime, Kellogg says). Indeed, a few historical examples exist (the U.S. held elections during the Civil War and WWII, for instance). Ukrainian officials respond that their situation is uniquely challenging: a large portion of territory is occupied or under fire, millions of citizens (especially soldiers and refugees) would struggle to vote, and campaigning could distract from the war effort. Zelenskyy insists that Ukraine will not abandon democracy, but he contends that an election now would not truly be free or fair given Russian interference and martial law censorship (Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections - Atlantic Council). Ukraine’s civil society groups largely agree that an engineered wartime vote would be illegitimate (Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections - Atlantic Council). Essentially, while Ukraine remains committed to democratic norms, most experts believe an election before mid-2025 would not meet basic standards – potentially harming Ukraine’s democratic credentials more than bolstering them. The Kyiv-based NGO OPORA, which monitors elections, has also pointed out the near impossibility of proper monitoring and campaigning under current conditions (though this isn’t a published quote above, it’s been discussed in news forums).
• Zelenskyy’s Re-Election Prospects: If an early election did occur (say in late 2024 or early 2025), how likely is Zelenskyy to lose? On one hand, as discussed, polls show him as the clear front-runner with a strong base of support (63% of Ukrainians approve of Zelensky as president, poll shows). His leadership through the war has earned him respect domestically and internationally. On the other hand, some observers note that his ratings, while solid, have fallen from their peak, and war fatigue is a real phenomenon. By the end of 2024, approval had dipped to around 50–60% from the highs of 2022 (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News). Rebekah Koffler, a former U.S. intelligence officer, argued in one interview that “Zelenskyy is unlikely to win the elections, if they were to be held [now], because his popularity dropped significantly… Ukrainians are exhausted by the war and many have come to realize it’s unwinnable.” (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News) This pessimistic view aligns with Russian narratives, and many would contest the idea that Ukrainians see the war as unwinnable. Nonetheless, it raises the point that public opinion could swing if people feel the war’s outcome is unsatisfactory. Ivan Gomza (the Kyiv School of Economics professor) stresses that the perceived outcome of the conflict would be crucial: Zelenskyy’s chances depend on whether any ceasefire/peace is seen as a “victory, honorable draw, or defeat.” (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News) If Ukrainians felt Zelenskyy ended the war on bad terms (e.g. painful concessions), they might seek new leadership. Conversely, a peace deemed a victory would almost certainly sweep Zelenskyy back into office on a wave of relief. Importantly, holding an election in wartime could itself undermine Zelenskyy’s odds, because campaigning might open rifts in the united front. Right now, even political rivals like Poroshenko support Zelenskyy against Russia. In a competitive election, they’d feel compelled to criticize him on other issues (corruption, economy, etc.), potentially eroding the extraordinary unity that Ukraine has maintained. Voters might also blame Zelenskyy for any disappointments (military setbacks, slow reforms) once given a chance to choose – whereas currently most grievances are put aside to focus on the external enemy. This dynamic is another reason experts suggest keeping the powder dry on elections until the war is conclusively over. In sum, while Zelenskyy probably would win an election held before July 2025, it is not a risk-free bet – and the mere act of holding such an election poses far greater dangers to Ukraine’s stability and war effort.
• Western Support Considerations: One other factor is how international support might affect Zelenskyy’s fate. Ukraine is heavily reliant on Western military and financial aid. If a major donor like the U.S. were to condition future aid on political changes (e.g. “hold elections or we cut support”), Ukraine would face enormous pressure to comply. So far, apart from rhetoric, the U.S. has not actually cut off aid or set such conditions publicly. European aid continues unabated, and in the U.S. Congress there remains bipartisan (if softening) support for Ukraine. However, Trump’s approach raises the possibility that Washington’s backing could waver unless Zelenskyy shows movement toward negotiations and, by extension, elections. This puts Zelenskyy in a delicate spot: he must balance not appearing undemocratic with not playing into Putin’s hands. For now, he seems to have navigated this by securing public support at home (so no one can seriously call him a dictator domestically) and by pointing out that Ukraine is fighting for democratic values against a dictatorship. Allies like Germany, France, the UK, etc., firmly support Ukraine’s stance that elections during the war are untenable. As long as that wider coalition holds, Zelenskyy is diplomatically shielded from external attempts to force his resignation. But should international consensus fracture, it could impact the likelihood of him leaving early. This is an area to watch, though as of early 2025, Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic partners still prioritize unity and victory over pushing Kyiv on democratic timing issues.

Conclusion: Outlook Through July 2025

Considering all the evidence – recent news, political developments, expert views, and official statements – the likelihood of President Zelenskyy leaving office before July 2025 is low under current conditions. Several converging reasons support this conclusion:

• Wartime Legal Framework: Ukraine’s constitution and laws during martial law give Zelenskyy a continuing mandate until a new election can be held (Zelenskiy: Ukraine Elections Possible This Year If Martial Law Ends) (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt). With martial law still in effect and likely to be extended further into 2025, there is no legal way to replace the president without ending the state of war. The Ukrainian parliament’s recent resolution reinforces that stance unambiguously (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt). In essence, as long as the war goes on, Zelenskyy stays on.
• Political Unity in Ukraine: Domestic political forces are not pushing for his early exit – in fact, quite the opposite. The opposition agrees that holding an election now would be dangerous and illegitimate (Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections - Atlantic Council). The public, by large majorities, prefers to postpone voting until peace returns (Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections - Atlantic Council). Zelenskyy’s approval ratings, while lower than at the war’s start, are still high, and he is seen as the figure who has kept the country resilient. There is no popular movement calling for his resignation or replacement; rather, most Ukrainians continue to rally around their wartime president (Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections - Atlantic Council) (Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections - Atlantic Council). This makes any internal ouster or voluntary resignation highly unlikely barring a severe turn in public sentiment.
• Military Situation: The trajectory of the war does not currently indicate a definitive end by mid-2025. Front lines have been largely stalemated with grinding battles, and while peace talks are being mentioned, they are fraught with challenging preconditions (like Russia demanding Ukrainian elections, and Ukraine demanding Russian withdrawal and justice). Unless a dramatic breakthrough in peace negotiations occurs in the next few months, it is improbable that martial law would be lifted and an election organized in time for a new president to take office by July 2025. Most analysts forecast the conflict – or at least a tense standoff – will extend into late 2025 or beyond (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News). If that holds true, Zelenskyy will still be president at mid-2025, as the nation continues to prioritize stability and defense over politics.
• International Stance: While Russian and Trump-administration pressures add uncertainty, so far they have not translated into concrete changes in Ukraine’s position. In fact, Ukraine and most of its allies have doubled down that forcing elections now would reward the aggressor (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt) (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News). Unless the U.S. (under Trump) were to take the drastic step of cutting off support to coerce Ukraine – which would be a major geopolitical move with its own risks – Zelenskyy can likely withstand the rhetoric. European powers and institutions like the UN continue to back Zelenskyy’s legitimacy (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters). This broad support internationally makes an early exit less likely, because Zelenskyy isn’t isolated; he’s still seen as the rightful leader of Ukraine’s resistance. Indeed, any attempt to remove him undemocratically (e.g. a coup or external pressure) would cause an outcry and lack legitimacy.
• Contingency – Peace Deal Scenario: The one scenario that could change the timeline is if a peace deal or ceasefire is reached and Ukraine deems the war effectively over. In that case, as Zelenskyy himself acknowledges, elections would follow relatively swiftly (Zelenskiy: Ukraine Elections Possible This Year If Martial Law Ends). Were that to happen ahead of July 2025, Zelenskyy’s tenure would hinge on the election’s outcome. It’s not possible to predict with certainty – he would enter such an election as the favorite, but voters’ verdict would depend on their satisfaction with the peace terms and post-war recovery. Still, even this “best-case” scenario for an early transition involves Zelenskyy overseeing the process until a successor is democratically chosen. There is no indication he would refuse to relinquish power after a free election; on the contrary, he has signaled he would respect the result and only stay as long as the people wish. Thus, even in the event of a 2025 election, an orderly handover (if he lost or didn’t run) or a renewed mandate (if he won) would be the likely outcome – not a chaotic removal.

Taking everything into account, President Zelenskyy is expected to remain in office at least through mid-2025, absent an unforeseen development. The constitutional bar on elections during the war, combined with sustained public support and allied backing, makes an involuntary departure highly unlikely. As one Ukrainian lawmaker put it during the recent parliamentary debate, Russia’s aggression has made normal elections impossible for now, and the nation needs continuity of leadership to see this war through (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt). Zelenskyy himself summed up the situation, saying Ukrainians must “move forward together till the end, the victorious end” (Zelensky on legitimacy dispute: My term is not over yet) – a sentiment that captures why he’s still in charge. In conclusion, the odds of Zelenskyy leaving office before July 2025 are low, unless a just peace is achieved sooner than expected, in which case Ukraine’s democracy will resume on its own terms. All current signs point to Zelenskyy continuing to lead Ukraine in its defense against Russia into the summer of 2025 and likely beyond.

Sources:

• Reuters – “Trump tells ‘dictator’ Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine” (Feb 19, 2025) (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters) (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters) (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters) (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters)
• Kyiv Independent – “Zelensky on legitimacy dispute: My term is not over yet” (May 21, 2024) (Zelensky on legitimacy dispute: My term is not over yet) (Zelensky on legitimacy dispute: My term is not over yet)
• Kyiv Independent – “Parliament passes resolution on elections when there is ‘sustainable peace’…” (Feb 25, 2025) (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt) (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt) (Ukraine passes resolution on elections when there is 'sustainable peace' at 2nd attempt)
• Atlantic Council – “Ukrainians… resoundingly reject wartime elections” (Feb 20, 2025) (Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections - Atlantic Council) (Ukrainians are proudly democratic but resoundingly reject wartime elections - Atlantic Council)
• Kyiv Independent – “63% of Ukrainians approve of Zelensky…poll shows” (Feb 21, 2025) (63% of Ukrainians approve of Zelensky as president, poll shows) (63% of Ukrainians approve of Zelensky as president, poll shows)
• Foreign Policy – “Why Early Elections in Ukraine Pave the Way for Putin” (Feb 19, 2025) (Why Early Elections in Ukraine Pave the Way for Putin – Foreign Policy) (Why Early Elections in Ukraine Pave the Way for Putin – Foreign Policy)
• Reuters (Fact Check) – Zelenskyy’s approval 63%, debunking 4% claim (Feb 21, 2025) (Fact Check: Zelenskiy's latest approval rating is 63%, not 4%, contrary to Trump's claim  | Reuters)
• Reuters – Zelenskyy interview/remarks on Trump’s claims (Feb 19, 2025) (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters)
• RFE/RL – Zelenskyy on possibility of 2025 elections if war’s hot phase ends (Jan 3, 2025) (Zelenskiy: Ukraine Elections Possible This Year If Martial Law Ends) (Zelenskiy: Ukraine Elections Possible This Year If Martial Law Ends)
• Fox News – “Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to polls…” (Feb 18, 2025) (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News) (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News) (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News) (Zelenskyy faces perilous re-election odds as US, Russia push Ukraine to go to the polls as part of peace deal | Fox News)
• Reuters – “Trump and Zelenskiy clash, leaving Ukraine exposed…” (Mar 1, 2025) (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters) (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters) (Trump tells 'dictator' Zelenskiy to move fast or lose Ukraine | Reuters)