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From freem


This conversation was exported from ChatGPT[1]

gpt-5-2[edit | edit source]

User: could we design a wireless protocol that would not allow viruses to transmit, based off how bitcoin works it could read…[edit | edit source]

could we design a wireless protocol that would not allow viruses to transmit, based off how bitcoin works it could read the encrypted data, but no one else could, to see if anything like pegasus vurus is being transmitted?

Assistant: Short answer: yes in principle, but not in the way people usually imagine, and it wouldn’t magically “block all viruses…[edit | edit source]

Short answer: yes in principle, but not in the way people usually imagine, and it wouldn’t magically “block all viruses.” What is possible is a new class of wireless/network protocols that make stealth malware like Pegasus dramatically harder to deliver and operate, using ideas similar to Bitcoin, zero-knowledge cryptography, and capability-based security.

Let’s break this down clearly and realistically.

1. The core problem with today’s wireless protocols[edit | edit source]

Current wireless + IP networking assumes:

  • Blind transport: routers and radios forward encrypted blobs without knowing what they are
  • Endpoint trust: the phone OS decides what to accept
  • Post-delivery inspection: malware is detected after execution

Pegasus succeeds because:

  • It uses zero-click exploits
  • It hides inside legitimate encrypted traffic
  • The network has no right or ability to question payload intent

2. What Bitcoin actually gives us (conceptually)[edit | edit source]

Bitcoin doesn’t “read encrypted data,” but it forces proof before acceptance:

Key ideas:

  • Proof before propagation (PoW / signatures)
  • Deterministic validation rules
  • No trusted intermediaries
  • Global verifiability without revealing secrets

That’s the inspiration—not the blockchain itself.

3. A virus-resistant wireless protocol (conceptual design)[edit | edit source]

Think of this as “Proof-of-Benign-Intent Networking”.

A. Capability-based packets (critical idea)[edit | edit source]

Instead of:

“Here’s data, trust me”

You require:

“Here’s data + cryptographic proof that I’m allowed to send this type of data to you”

Each packet (or stream) carries:

  • A capability token
  • Cryptographically bound to: - sender - receiver - payload type - execution permissions

If malware tries to reuse or forge it → packet is dropped at the radio or kernel level.

This already exists partially in research systems (Capsicum, seL4).

B. Zero-knowledge malware screening (this is where your idea fits)[edit | edit source]

You cannot decrypt traffic on the network (privacy issue), but you can require:

“Prove your payload does NOT contain known exploit structures”

Using Zero-Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs):

  • Sender proves: - “This payload does not match any pattern in exploit class X” - Without revealing the payload
  • Receiver verifies proof before accepting

This is:

  • Computationally heavy today
  • But feasible for small payload classes
  • Very aligned with Bitcoin-style verification
C. Proof-of-Execution Safety (Pegasus killer)[edit | edit source]

Pegasus relies on:

  • Triggering hidden OS parsing paths (images, fonts, codecs)

A safer protocol would require:

  • Payloads to declare execution class - data-only - media decode - script - native execution
  • OS refuses undeclared execution paths

So an image cannot execute code because the protocol forbids it, not the OS.

This flips security from:

“detect bad behavior”
to
“only allow pre-proven behavior”
D. Network-level anomaly consensus (Bitcoin-like)[edit | edit source]

Instead of one device deciding:

  • Multiple nodes observe metadata (not content)
  • If anomalous patterns appear: - sudden zero-click attempts - unusual codec paths
  • Devices temporarily refuse traffic class globally

This is similar to:

  • Bitcoin rejecting invalid blocks
  • Without central authority

4. Why this doesn’t exist yet[edit | edit source]

Technical barriers[edit | edit source]
  • ZK proofs are expensive on mobile radios
  • Legacy compatibility is brutal
  • OS vendors benefit from closed pipelines
Political barriers[edit | edit source]
  • Governments like zero-click exploits
  • Law enforcement would resist mandatory provable innocence

Pegasus exists because the network is blind.

5. What can realistically be built today[edit | edit source]

You could build a research-grade or niche protocol that:

  • Works for: - medical devices - drones - industrial IoT - activist phones
  • Uses: - capability tokens - declarative payload execution - optional ZK screening for high-risk payloads

This would not stop all malware, but it would:

  • Kill zero-click attacks
  • Make covert delivery extremely noisy
  • Force attackers back to social engineering

6. If you wanted to turn this into a real project[edit | edit source]

A realistic MVP path:

  1. New transport layer over QUIC
  2. Capability-based packet permissions
  3. Strict payload execution declarations
  4. Optional ZK proofs for media payloads
  5. Open spec (critical—trust comes from transparency)

This could be a DARPA-level idea, not sci-fi.

Bottom line[edit | edit source]

Your intuition is very good:

“Could the network itself refuse to carry malware, without reading private data?”

Yes—with cryptographic proofs, capabilities, and strict execution semantics, inspired by Bitcoin but not copying it.

If you want, I can:

  • Sketch a protocol spec
  • Map this to Android/iOS kernels
  • Or turn this into a whitepaper or GitHub epic

Just tell me the direction.

References[edit | edit source]

  1. "Wireless Protocol Security". ChatGPT. Retrieved 2026-01-19.