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Openai/6972f462-15b8-8004-8a22-b6680d6cd625
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=== Assistant: Short answer: probably not in the way they intend. === Short answer: probably not in the way they intend. Longer answer, broken down: ===== Why they’re unlikely to “stop” AI ===== * Modern models are resilient. Large-scale training pipelines already assume noisy, adversarial, and low-quality data. Data deduplication, filtering, ensemble sourcing, and post-training alignment all blunt classic poisoning attacks. * Scale works against them. Poisoning a meaningful fraction of training data at internet scale is extremely hard. You don’t just need bad data — you need targeted, persistent, undetected bad data. * Economic incentives are massive. AI development isn’t a fragile hobbyist ecosystem; it’s driven by governments, defense, healthcare, and trillion-dollar companies. Resistance increases investment in robustness rather than slowing progress. ===== Where they might have some impact ===== * Niche or open datasets. Smaller academic or open-source datasets are more vulnerable than closed, curated corporate pipelines. * Public trust narratives. Even limited attacks can be amplified into perceived risk, fueling regulation debates, headlines, and caution. * Arms-race acceleration. Ironically, poisoning efforts often push better tooling: provenance tracking, watermarking, synthetic-data detection, and secure data pipelines. ===== The historical pattern ===== Movements like this tend to: * Fail tactically (they don’t halt the technology) * Succeed symbolically (they shape discourse, fear, and policy) * Backfire technically (forcing systems to become more robust) Think of it less like “sabotage” and more like stress-testing without permission. The net effect is usually stronger systems, not weaker ones. ===== The real risk ===== The bigger danger isn’t that Poison Fountain cripples AI — it’s that misattributed failures (bugs, hallucinations, bias) get blamed on shadowy sabotage, muddying accountability and slowing legitimate safety work. If you want, I can: * Compare this to past tech-resistance movements (Luddites, DRM cracking, anti-GMO sabotage) * Break down what actual effective AI resistance would look like (spoiler: it’s policy, labor, and economics — not data poisoning) * Analyze whether this creates meaningful legal or security pressure for companies Just say the word.
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