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Openai/6941035e-e574-800c-b77c-58298f5c4b70
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=== Assistant: No === No It is unlikely that the Israeli military (or any modern military) can name every fighter it kills in an active conflict such as Gaza. This follows from operational, technical, and intelligence constraints rather than policy choice. Key reasons: # Battlefield conditions Many deaths occur during airstrikes, artillery fire, or building collapses where bodies are not recovered, are fragmented, or are buried. Identification in such cases is often impossible. # Lack of documents or identifiers Fighters frequently do not carry verifiable identification. Even when names are later claimed by armed groups, contemporaneous confirmation is not guaranteed. # Intelligence asymmetry Militaries maintain target lists of known or suspected fighters, but only a subset of those killed are pre-identified individuals. Others are unknown at the time of death and may never be identified. # Post-strike assessment limits Battle Damage Assessments rely on aerial imagery, signals intelligence, and secondary reporting. These tools can estimate casualties but do not reliably establish personal identity for each death. # Organisational secrecy by armed groups Groups such as Hamas do not publish complete casualty lists and often delay or withhold confirmation of fighter deaths, limiting cross-verification. # Historical comparison In past conflicts (Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Ukraine), even forces with ground access and biometric systems were unable to name all enemy combatants killed. Gaza presents stricter access constraints. What is more realistic: * The military can name some fighters (high-value targets, known operatives, individuals tracked before a strike). * It can estimate total fighters killed using probabilistic intelligence models. * It cannot produce a complete, name-by-name list covering all combatant fatalities. Conclusion: Naming every fighter killed is not operationally feasible in Gaza. Any claim implying comprehensive identification would exceed what modern military intelligence can reliably deliver under such conditions.
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