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Openai/69256b37-1cac-8004-bb0d-12fcbb764b89
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==== Structural background (Bridge360-relevant): ==== * Economy: - Property + local-government-debt slowdown is already biting; independent analysts see 2024–25 growth well below official numbers, with property and LGFVs as core weak points. Rhodium Group<ref>{{cite web|title=Rhodium Group|url=https://rhg.com/research/after-the-fall-chinas-economy-in-2025/|publisher=Rhodium Group|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref> - A new debt-management department at the Ministry of Finance is being built precisely to handle systemic local-debt risk. Reuters<ref>{{cite web|title=Reuters|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinas-finance-ministry-sets-up-new-debt-management-department-2025-11-03/|publisher=reuters.com|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref> * Demographics: - Population is already shrinking; China recorded its third consecutive year of population decline by end-2024. AP News<ref>{{cite web|title=AP News|url=https://apnews.com/article/6415abe5e6422de26bd838b6bf0b7564|publisher=AP News|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref> * Governance: - Xi has centralized decision-making, moving toward personalistic rule and reversing more collective leadership norms. USCC<ref>{{cite web|title=USCC|url=https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Chapter_1--CCP_Decision-Making_and_Xi_Jinpings_Centralization_of_Authority.pdf|publisher=uscc.gov|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref> * Climate / physical shocks: - Extreme floods and other weather shocks are already recurring and are expected to intensify. The Guardian<ref>{{cite web|title=The Guardian|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/24/we-need-to-be-prepared-china-adapts-to-era-of-extreme-flooding|publisher=The Guardian|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref> Bridge360 interpretation (2025–2035): '' Capability to keep F within survivable bounds: - Short-term capability is ''moderately high*. - High autocracy + surveillance + fiscal capacity still give Beijing strong tools to suppress visible instability, recapitalize parts of the system, and coordinate massive responses to shocks (floods, pandemics, financial stress). - But each intervention tends to externalize entropy (onto local governments, households, private entrepreneurs, or neighbors), so F is drifting upward, even if superficial stability holds. Rough Bridge360 reading: * F (systemic fragility): moving from “stressed but controllable” toward the upper end of your survivable band (say ~0.4 → 0.5). * Probability that the regime keeps F below outright failure thresholds in this horizon (no civil war/state collapse, but possibly serious crises): ~70–80%, assuming: - no major war over Taiwan, and - no global depression worse than 2008–09 + COVID combined.
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