Editing Openai/6910f719-b034-8006-930d-0d5190a7c617 (section)

===== 1. The description of the John Searle “Chinese Room” argument is accurate: Roughly, a person who doesn’t understand Chinese manipulates symbols per rules and outputs appropriate Chinese responses; Searle uses that to argue a system could behave as if it understands language yet lacks genuine understanding. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy<ref>{{cite web|title=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|url=https://iep.utm.edu/chinese-room-argument/|publisher=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|access-date=2025-11-10}}</ref> =====
# The argument is directed at “strong AI” (i.e., the view that a suitably programmed computer is a mind/understanding) rather than simply any AI or simulation of intelligence. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy<ref>{{cite web|title=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|url=https://iep.utm.edu/chinese-room-argument/|publisher=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy|access-date=2025-11-10}}</ref>
# The claim that the Chinese Room primarily targets symbolic AI / rule‑based systems (i.e., finite rulebooks, symbol manipulation) is supported: Searle emphasised syntax vs semantics. Encyclopedia Britannica<ref>{{cite web|title=Encyclopedia Britannica|url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/Chinese-room-argument|publisher=Encyclopedia Britannica|access-date=2025-11-10}}</ref>
# It’s correct that there has been scholarly discussion about how the Chinese Room might be less relevant (or needs re‑interpretation) in the era of large neural nets/connectionism. For example: modern AI uses large datasets, neural “emergent representations”, not just rule‑books. Wikipedia<ref>{{cite web|title=Wikipedia|url=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room|publisher=en.wikipedia.org|access-date=2025-11-10}}</ref>