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=== Assistant: This is a really good way to frame it — and you’re right that the only live uncertainty in your model is whether Sotoma… === This is a really good way to frame it — and you’re right that the only live uncertainty in your model is whether Sotomayor/Kagan/Jackson behave as a bloc or splinter. Everything else you’ve bracketed pretty sensibly. Let me answer your actual question directly, and then stress-test your frame a bit. ==== ### ==== Yes — much more often than not — but not mechanically, and not on procedural/institutional questions. They are: * A tight ideological cluster on civil rights, criminal procedure, administrative law, voting, and access-to-justice issues. * Less of a bloc on technical, procedural, commercial, and institutional design questions — especially when: - The case is fact-specific - The stakes are structural rather than normative - The question is “what rule should courts adopt” rather than “who should win” Hikma v. Amarin is much closer to the second category. ==== They are highly cohesive when: ==== | | | | --- | --- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In those areas, they are functionally a voting unit. ==== They splinter much more when the case is: ==== * Commercial / economic * Highly technical (IP, securities, tax, bankruptcy) * Procedural and rule-design oriented * Focused on incentives rather than rights In those, you often see: * Kagan peel off to join conservatives * Or Sotomayor dissent alone * Or Jackson take a distinct position And critically: Twombly/Iqbal / pleading / inference standards fall squarely in this splinter-prone zone. ==== Here’s the subtlety that matters most for your model: ==== All three are uncomfortable with pleading rules that bar plaintiffs from access to facts that are asymmetrically held by defendants. That gives them a shared instinct against tightening pleading standards too much. But: * Kagan is more concerned about floodgates and administrability. * Sotomayor is more concerned about fairness and asymmetry. * Jackson is likely very sensitive to power asymmetry and informational imbalance. So their instincts point the same way — but their thresholds differ. That means: * They may align in result (deny cert), * But not necessarily in rationale or intensity. And that matters for whether they vote together at the cert stage. ==== Another key point: Justices are less ideological and less bloc-driven at the cert stage than at the merits stage. ==== At cert, they are thinking: * Is this a good vehicle? * Is there a clean split? * Is the record right? * Will this produce a good rule? * Is this the right time? Those questions scramble ideology. So even if they’d all ultimately be skeptical of Hikma’s position on the merits, one of them (especially Kagan) could still say: : And vote deny cert, even if she’d agree with Hikma in theory. ==== ### ==== : That’s plausible. But the more realistic picture is: * They are not a mechanical bloc in this type of case. * They are likely to diverge on vehicle quality and institutional value. * Kagan is especially likely to defect from a “bloc yes” if she thinks this case is a poor platform. So the default expectation should be: : Which pushes your base case toward cert denied. ==== You’re assuming: ==== * Kavanaugh = yes (reasonable) * Other conservatives = no (plausible) * Liberals decide the outcome But it’s also plausible that: * Roberts or Barrett could be persuadable on institutional grounds, * Or that Kavanaugh’s “yes” is not firm if the SG brief didn’t add anything new (as you’ve pointed out). So the coalition math is not quite as clean as 1 vs 5 vs 3. ==== Do the three liberals tend to move as a bloc? ==== → Yes, in rights and ideology cases. No, in technical, procedural, or vehicle-dependent cases. Is Hikma v. Amarin in the bloc-prone category? → No. It’s in the splinter-prone category. So your read is right to focus on them — but the conclusion should be: : Which means your overall handicap should still lean toward denial, unless you see an independent path to a fourth vote outside that bloc. That’s the cleanest, least story-driven way to model it.
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