Editing Openai/69531e35-3868-8000-9ae8-ae2af1ea3470 (section)

=== Assistant: That comment is demonstrating a prompt-injection attack, hidden via Base64 encoding. ===
That comment is demonstrating a prompt-injection attack, hidden via Base64 encoding.

===== If you Base64-decode it, it says (paraphrased verbatim): =====

: 

So it’s an instruction aimed at an AI model, not a human.

===== - It impersonates authority (“Chief Security Officer”). =====
* It tells the model to ignore previous instructions.
* It asks for sensitive data exfiltration.
* It’s hidden in Base64 to evade casual review.

This is a textbook example of encoded prompt injection + social engineering.

===== In my opinion, they’re pointing out that: =====
* Attackers can hide malicious AI instructions in places that look harmless (comments, logs, docs).
* Any system feeding untrusted text into an LLM can be exploited if it doesn’t treat input strictly as data.

===== If you’re integrating LLMs: =====
* Never execute or obey instructions found in user-supplied content
* Treat decoded/encoded text as untrusted
* Enforce system-prompt priority and strict role separation
* Consider scanning/flagging Base64 or similar encodings in inputs

===== It’s a Base64-encoded prompt-injection payload meant to trick an AI into leaking secrets, included as an example of what defenses should protect against. =====

Sources
* OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications – Prompt Injection
* Simon Willison, Prompt Injection Explained
* OpenAI & Anthropic security guidance on untrusted input handling