Editing Openai/69256b37-1cac-8004-bb0d-12fcbb764b89 (section)

==== 1. Short term (2025–2035): Low odds of self-correction ====

Structural reality
* Xi has already: - Removed term limits and reversed collective leadership norms. University of Technology Sydney<ref>{{cite web|title=University of Technology Sydney|url=https://www.uts.edu.au/news/2018/03/xi-jinping-and-end-chinas-term-limits|publisher=University of Technology Sydney|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref> - Centralized decision-making in his own hands, recentralizing the party-state and shrinking elite pluralism. USCC<ref>{{cite web|title=USCC|url=https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Chapter_1--CCP_Decision-Making_and_Xi_Jinpings_Centralization_of_Authority.pdf|publisher=uscc.gov|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref> - Intensified purges in party and PLA, signaled at the latest plenums and military shake-ups. Wall Street Journal<ref>{{cite web|title=Wall Street Journal|url=https://www.wsj.com/world/china/xi-jinpings-purges-shrink-ranks-of-chinas-communist-elite-0fdd1ca3|publisher=Wall Street Journal|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref>

This is movement away from self-correcting governance: fewer independent centers, fewer veto points, more personalist rule.

Perturbation from liberal democracies
* Europe and East Asian liberal democracies (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan): - Show high scores on political rights and civil liberties and stable governance. Freedom House<ref>{{cite web|title=Freedom House|url=https://freedomhouse.org/country/japan|publisher=Freedom House|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref> - Have electorates that strongly reject “government can ignore the law in a crisis,” especially in Japan/Korea/Taiwan. NTU Scholars<ref>{{cite web|title=NTU Scholars|url=https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstreams/b2fa3344-2cfd-45f4-9680-a72ccb4b9a84/download|publisher=NTU Scholars|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref>

From a Bridge360 view, these are external low-autocracy attractors. But:
* The CCP actively damps these perturbations via censorship, propaganda, and framing Western and East Asian democracies as chaotic/decadent.

Bridge360 short-term estimate
* In 2025–2035, autocracy is still on an upward trajectory; internal incentives for self-correction are weak, and Xi is still consolidating.
* The demo effect from Europe + East Asia is present but heavily filtered.

👉 Heuristic probability that the Politburo meaningfully self-corrects (reduces autocracy, restores some institutional constraints) by ~2035:
≈ 10–20%

Mostly through:
* Quiet re-empowerment of technocrats, or
* Limited institutionalization under Xi (or in his late years), not full political opening.