Editing Openai/69256b37-1cac-8004-bb0d-12fcbb764b89 (section)

==== Structural background: ====
* Demography by 2100: - UN projections: China’s population could fall to around 770 million or even ~630 million, i.e. roughly half of today’s level, with a sharply inverted age structure. Scientific American<ref>{{cite web|title=Scientific American|url=https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/chinas-population-could-shrink-to-half-by-2100/|publisher=Scientific American|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref>
* Climate / physical environment: - Extreme heat, floods, and droughts are projected to increase sharply, particularly in northern and western regions, with large shares of land and population exposed to severe heat waves under 2°C+ global warming scenarios. Taylor & Francis Online<ref>{{cite web|title=Taylor & Francis Online|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1674927825000267|publisher=Taylor & Francis Online|access-date=2025-11-25}}</ref>
* Global system shifts: - Relative economic weight will likely move toward other population centers (India, Africa, Southeast Asia, possibly Latin America), and toward digital/AI-driven networks rather than classic export–manufacturing models.

Bridge360 interpretation (2055–2100):

In your terms:
* A rigid, high-autocracy Politburo trying to run: - a much older society, - on a smaller tax base, - amid higher climate adaptation costs - in a more multipolar AI-mediated economy,

is operating with a very tight entropy budget.

Unless the governance template changes, Bridge360 expects:
* F to drift above survivable levels for long stretches (e.g. >0.65–0.7),
* implying: - high risk of major political reconfiguration (elites reshuffling the system, partial fragmentation, or formal shifts in center–periphery power), - or a series of increasingly severe crises needed to “reset” the system’s configuration (your “high-entropy morphisms”).

Capability forecast:
* Under continuing high autocracy with little structural reform: - Low capability to keep fragility within survivable bounds all the way to 2100. - In plain terms: it’s unlikely that the same Politburo governance template, with similar personalization and opacity, survives intact through late-century shocks without deep transformation or break.
* Under evolution toward more distributed, entropy-bounded governance (looser centralization, more local resilience, real institutional feedback): - China can remain a major, relatively stable attractor, but not as the same high-autocracy configuration we see in the 2020s.

Rough Bridge360 reading:
'' Probability that a ''rigid high-autocracy Politburo* keeps F within survivable bounds all the way to 2100: - ≲20–30%, - with the remaining probability weight on: - managed transitions (elite-led “soft reconfiguration”), - or disorderly corrections (hard crises before new governance forms emerge).